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UNITED STATES v. FIELD: INFRARED SCANS;
CURBING POTENTIAL PRIVACY INVASIONS
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits
"unreasonable searches and seizures."' While the Supreme Court initially
construed this amendment liberally,2 subsequent case law narrowed the
definition of a "search" 3 to physical intrusions.4 In Katz v. United
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Id.
2 See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). In Boyd, the federal government claimed
that the defendant had fraudulently avoided paying duty taxes on imported plate glass. Id. at 617-
18. To prove these allegations, the prosecution needed to establish the quantity and value of the
glass in a previous shipment. Id. at 618. The district attorney received a court order directing
the defendant to produce a shipment invoice. Id. The Court held that the -compulsory production
of a man's private papers to establish a criminal charge against him, or to forfeit his property,"
id. at 622, violates the Fourth Amendment. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630. After quoting Entick v.
Carrington, 19 Howell's St. Tr. 1029 (1765), the Court stated:
The principles laid down in [Entick] affect the very essence of constitutional liberty and
security. They reach farther than the concrete form of the case then before the court,
with its adventitious circumstances; they apply to all invasions on the part of the
government and its employees [sic] of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies
of life. It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that
constitutes the essence of the offense, but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of
personal security, personal liberty and private property, where that right has never
been forfeited by his conviction of some public offense ....
Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630. Although the court order may not have constituted a traditional search
and seizure, Boyd recognized that it is not the way in which the government obtains information
that implicates our Fourth Amendment rights; instead, it is the actual invasion of a privacy
interest. See Melvin Gutterman, A Formulation of the Value and Means Models of the Fourth
Amendment in theAge of Technologically Enhanced Surveillance, 39 SYRACUSE L. REV. 647,654
(1988) (stating that Supreme Court recognized that Fourth Amendment protects citizens from
invasions to "'indefeasible right of personal security, liberty and private property'" (quoting
Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630)).
1 The Fourth Amendment's language requires a two-part analysis to determine whether a
government act or search is unconstitutional. Richard G. Wilkins, Defining the "Reasonable
Expectation of Privacy": An Emerging Tripartite Analysis, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1077, 1078 n.3
(1987).
First, a court must decide if a "search" occurred. Id. "A 'search' occurs 'when an
expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable is infringed.'" United States
v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 712 (1984) (quoting United States v. Jacobsen. 466 U.S. 109. 113
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States,5 however, the Court revised its Fourth Amendment analysis 6 after
technological advances eroded the practicality of this rigid approach.7
(1984)). Second, the search must be examined to see if it is unreasonable. Wilkins. supra. at
1078 n.3. Normally, a search is unreasonable unless a search warrant is first obtained. See, e.g..
Karo, 468 U.S. at 717 ("Warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable . . . ."). The
Supreme Court, however, has permitted warrantless searches under certain circumstances. See,
e.g., United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 807-09 (1982) (holding that when there is probable
cause to believe that automobile contains contraband, warrantless search is permissible);
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) ("[O]ne of the specifically established
exceptions to the requirements of both a warrant and probable cause is a search that is conducted
pursuant to consent.") (citations omitted); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465
(1971) ("It is well established that under certain circumstances the police may seize evidence in
plain view without a warrant."); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298 (1967) (holding that
"exigencies of the situation" permitted warrantless search). This Comment focuses only
on whether a "search" has occurred. It does not examine the second part of the Fourth
Amendment analysis - whether a search is unreasonable because the government failed to obtain
a search warrant where one was required.
' See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928). In Olmstead. the government
gathered evidence of a conspiracy by tapping the defendant's telephones. Id. at 456-57. Wires
were inserted into the telephone lines without any trespass to the defendant's property. Id. at 457.
The evidence gathered from the overheard conversations led to convictions. Id. The Court held
that the government did not violate the Fourth Amendment because there was no physical
invasion. Id. at 466. In attempting to balance the rights of individual citizens with the interests
of society, Olnstead provided the guidance lacking in Boyd by requiring a physical trespass to
constitute a "search." Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 465; see also Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S.
505, 509 (1961) (holding that, since "spike mike" physically penetrated defendant's heating duct.
eavesdropping violated Fourth Amendment).
' 389 U.S. 347 (1967). In Katz, the government attached an electronic listening device to the
outside of a public telephone booth where the defendant was suspected of transmitting illegal
wagering information. Id. at 348. The defendant was convicted on the basis of this evidence. id..
and the Court found that the information received from the listening device constituted a search
and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 353.
6 Katz, 389 U.S. at 353. In finding an unreasonable search and seizure, the Court explained
that -the Fourth Amendment protects people-and not simply 'areas'-against unreasonable
searches and seizures . . . . [T]he reach of that Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or
absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure." Id.
' See Wilkins, supra note 3, at 1087-88 ("The Court's abandonment of a rigid, property-
based construction of the fourth amendment. . . laid to rest most of the criticism that the law had
become stilted and anachronistic in its attempt to accommodate modern investigative technology
. .. ")  As technology advances, a police officer's physical location becomes less important.
David E. Steinberg, Making Sense of Sense-Enhanced Searches, 74 MINN. L. REV. 563. 588
(1990). Steinberg explains:
[A] suspect will not care how police examine an object located in the suspect's
backyard: police may view the object with their unaided vision from one foot away [or]
use a high-powered telescope stationed a mile away. . . . In each case, the police gain
the same information about the suspect. Residents no longer receive significant
protection simply because police cannot enter onto their property without a warrant.
Id.; see also Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 473 (Brandeis. J., dissenting) (stating that Constitution must
be interpreted to prevent "[slubtler and more far-reaching means of invading privacy"); Dow
Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 240 (1986) (Powell, J., dissenting) ("[Tihis Court
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Under the Katz standard, Fourth Amendment protections extend to
situations where a person's subjective expectation of privacy is reason-
able.' While the flexible nature of this test9 accommodates technological
advancements, 0  its application has led to haphazard results." For
instance, courts have struggled to determine whether the government's use
of a Forward Looking Infrared Device ("FLIR"), 2 which is employed to
has adhered to a standard that ensured that Fourth Amendment rights would retain their vitality
as technology expanded the Government's capacity to commit unsuspected intrusions into private
areas and activities.").
8 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan created the applicable
Fourth Amendment test. Harvey Wingo. A 2020 Vision of Visual Surveillance and the Fourth
Amendment, 71 OR. L. REV. 1, 2 n.5 (1992); see, e.g., California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207. 211
(1986) (quoting language of Justice Harlan's concurrence); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735,
740 (1979) (citing Justice Harlan in articulating Fourth Amendment test). Harlan stated that in
order for a person to receive Fourth Amendment protection, one must satisfy "a twofold
requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and,
second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.'" Katz.
389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). At first, it seemed that the subjective portion of the
Katz test required that the government determine a person's actual state of mind. United States
v. Taborda, 635 F.2d 131, 137 (2d Cir. 1980). The test, however, only requires that a subjective
expectation be exhibited. Id. "We take this first factor to mean in essence that the defendant must
have acted in such a way that it would have been reasonable for him to expect that he would not
be observed." Id.
This Comment focuses on the "reasonable" element of the Katz test rather than the
subjective element.
9 Wilkins, supra note 3, at 1079-80.
30 Id. at 1087-88 (discussing how Katz revolutionized Fourth Amendment search analysis by
equipping courts with standard flexible enough to deal with emerging police investigatory
techniques).
1 Id. The Katz test is difficult to apply. Id. at 1107; Steinberg, supra note 7, at 583 (stating
that Supreme Court found test "too ephemeral to provide a workable framework"). Although the
"reasonable expectation of privacy" language is broad enough to encompass technological
advances, its limits are vague. Wilkins, supra note 3, at 1079-80, 1088. The Katz approach
"often embodies more 'flex' than 'analysis'" and "the judiciary has floundered in its attempt to
delineate which expectations of privacy are 'reasonable.'" Id. at 1079-80. In applying the Katz
test, reference must be made to what society deems acceptable either through law or through
implicit understandings. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 144 n.12 (1978) ("Legitimation of
expectations of privacy by law must have a source outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by
reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to understandings that are recognized
and permitted by society."). For example, after the war on drugs was declared during Ronald
Reagan's presidency, courts have condoned illegal searches under a "drug exception" to the
Fourth Amendment. Lynne M. Pochurek, Note, From the Battlefrontto the Homefront: Infrared
Surveillance and the War on Drugs Place Privacy Under Siege, 7 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 137, 144
(1994). The Court's reasonable expectation of privacy test seemed to be affected by the nation's
desire to eliminate drugs.
12 The FLIR (also known as a thermal imager) is a passive, nonintrusive instrument which
operates in the thermal infrared spectrum to detect differences in surface temperatures. United
States v. Porco, 842 F. Supp. 1393, 1396 (D. Wyo. 1994), aff'd sub nom., United States v.
Cusumano, 67 F.3d 1497 (10th Cir. 1995). While it does not measure actual temperatures, it
19951
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detect excess heat emanating from indoor marijuana growing operations,
constitutes a "search."' 3  Recently, in United States v. Field,4 the
United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin held that
a FLIR's scan constituted a "search."' 5
In Field, the government received information from two informants
that the defendant was growing marijuana in his home. 6 To investigate
this tip, a thermal imagery expert used a FLIR from a public road
approximately thirty to forty meters away to scan the defendant's home.'
Although the FLIR displayed an isolated heat source, the expert could not
compares the amount of heat radiated from different objects. United States v. Pinson. 24 F.3d
1056, 1057 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 664 (1994). In order to detect temperature
differences, an object's solar heat must dissipate. United States v. Field, 855 F. Supp. 1518, 1522
(W.D. Wis. 1994). Therefore, the FLIR can only scan effectively in the night or early morning.
Id. "The device is a hand held unit which looks like a 35 mm camera." Porco, 842 F. Supp. at
1396, and has a range from two feet to one quarter of a mile. Id. Objects scanned for temperature
differences are seen on a screen and can be videotaped. Id. A cool area will appear grey and a
relatively hotter area will appear bright white. Id. This device is among the most advanced and
effective law enforcement tools used to fight the current drug problem in the United States.
Pochurek, supra note 11, at 139.
After the Supreme Court concluded that it is permissible for the government to view a
person's property from an aircraft, marijuana growers were forced to grow their illegal plants
indoors. Lisa J. Steele, Waste Heat and Garbage: The Legalization of Warrantless Infrared
Searches. 29 CRIM. L. BULL. 19, 19-20 (1993). The high-intensity discharge bulbs needed to
grow marijuana indoors generate heat of approximately 150 degrees or more. Pinson. 24 F.3d
at 1057. The excessive heat generated by grow lamps can be detected by comparing the heat of
neighboring structures with a FLIR. State v. Young, 867 P.2d 593. 600 (Wash. 1994).
"3 Courts are currently split on this issue. Courts that have expressly upheld a warrantless
infrared scan include: United States v. Robinson, 62 F.3d 1325, 1328 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding
no subjective or reasonable expectation of privacy in heat emitted from home): United States v.
Ishmael, 48 F.3d 850, 853 (5th Cir.) (holding no reasonable expectation of privacy). cert. denied.
116 S. Ct. 74 (1995); United States v. Myers, 46 F.3d 668. 669-70 (7th Cir.) (finding no
subjective or reasonable expectation of privacy), cert. denied. 116 S. Ct. 213 (1995): Pinson. 24
F.3d at 1059 (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in heat emanations): United States v.
Ford, 34 F.3d 992, 996 (11th Cir. 1994) (noting no subjective or reasonable expectation of
privacy); United States v Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. 220, 225 (D. Haw. 1991), aff'd on other
grounds sub nom., United States v. Feeney, 984 F.2d 1053 (9th Cir. 1993). Courts that have held
the scan to be a "search" include: Cusumano, 67 F.3d at 1509; Field, 855 F. Supp. at 1522:
Young, 867 P.2d at 595.
14 855 F. Supp. 1518 (W.D. Wis. 1994).
'. Id. at 1519.
16 Field, 855 F. Supp. at 1524. Two informants notified an officer of activity evincing a
marijuana growing operation. Id. One informant stated that, while inside the defendant's home,
he smelled a very strong odor of marijuana and saw loaded handguns and $5000 in cash. Id.
Another informant, while driving past defendant's residence, noticed indoor lamps that are
generally used to help grow marijuana plants. Id. at 1524.
,7 Field, 855 F. Supp. at 1522. The expert testified that the FLIR was capable of showing
actual objects at a distance of 20 to 200 meters "with somewhat less detail than a television
picture." Id.; see supra note 12.
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identify its cause.' 8 The government then issued a subpoena duces tecum
which allowed authorities to obtain the defendant's electricity bills.' 9 The
bills showed unusually high electrical use.2' Based on the information
from the two informants, the FLIR, and the defendant's electricity bills, a
search warrant was issued.2' Authorities entered the premises and found
a marijuana growing operation in certain sheds.'
The district court held that the facts upon which the warrant was
issued were insufficient and, therefore, the court suppressed the evi-
dence. 23 In so doing, the court adopted the magistrate judge's findings in
full. 24  Chief Judge Crabb agreed with the magistrate judge's finding that
the FLIR scan was a "search."' The court rejected the government's
argument that a homeowner "abandons" heat when it escapes from his
home and found that a FLIR, because it can detect objects through a
home's walls, is more intrusive than analogous technology. 6 The court
reasoned that, unlike the privacy expectation one has in one's car or in
iS Field, 855 F. Supp. at 1523. The expert testified he did not know what was inside Field's
house; he only knew that there was an isolated heat source within the area indicated by the FLIR
white spot. Id. Afterwards, he scanned two similar nearby structures not located on Field's
property in order to establish a control group. Id. These structures did not contain any hotspots.
Id.
"I Field, 855 F. Supp. at 1523. The bills were subpoenaed to determine whether Field used
excessive electricity. Id.
I Field, 855 F. Supp. at 1523. Field's electricity bill averaged $200 per month - a typical
single-family residential customer's bills averaged $80 per month. Id. Large-scale farming
operations consume more electricity than solely residential use. Id. Field's property contained
three sheds or barns, a chicken coop, an unattached garage, and a two-story house. Although
about 20 head of cattle and other animals were on the property when it was subsequently
searched, the sheriff was unaware of the animals' existence when the warrant was issued. Id. at
1520, 1524-25.
I .d. at 1524-25.
-Field, 855 F. Supp. at 1525. "From outside the pole shed, an observer would be unable
to see anything suspicious, even if the door were open. Once inside, however, a person could go
down a side walkway and discover a marijuana grow operation hidden under piles of hay." Id.
A household dehumidifier was located in the area of the hotspot inside the defendant's home. Id.
The FLIR expert stated that this may have been the heat source. Id.
I Field, 855 F. Supp. at 1520. Chief Judge Crabb agreed with the magistrate judge and held
that "obtaining a thermal image of a residence is a search. . . requiring a warrant." Id. at 1519.
She rejected the magistrate judge's finding that the sheriff acted with reckless disregard by
intentionally omitting or misstating facts when he obtained the warrant. Id. at 1520. Chief Judge
Crabb concluded that the observation that Field's electricity use was significantly higher than
average was not, without more, enough to sustain the issuance of a search warrant. Id.
4 Id. at 1518.
Field, 855 F. Supp. at 1519.
I d. at 1519 (comparing FLIR, which detects lawful and unlawful activity, to dogs trained
to detect contraband).
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public,27 a person does not expect high technology surveillance to detect
activities within one's home.28 Concluding that the use of a thermal
imager was a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, the
court held that the evidence gathered when executing the warrant must be
suppressed .29
This Comment suggests that the court's analysis is unduly expansive
given the wide range of information that a FLIR can reveal." Depending
on its use in a particular case, an imager's scan may or may not be a
"search."'3' It is submitted that the Field court focused on a FLIR's
possible abuses32 to the exclusion of its permissible uses. This Comment
will present the proper constitutional analysis of the facts underlying Field
and will suggest to future courts alternative solutions to the FLIR issue..
Part One presents the factor approach implicitly found in the relevant case
law following Katz. This approach is then applied to Field. Part Two
advocates the proper balance between law enforcement and Fourth
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Field, 855 F. Supp. at 1518-20. The court held that since the evidence gathered by a
thermal imager must be excluded from a probable cause determination, and the remaining
evidence did not meet the probable cause requirement, the search warrant was invalid. Id. at
1520.
1 United States v. Robinson, 62 F.3d 1325, 1330 (1lth Cir. 1995) (noting that defendant's
home was hotter than surrounding objects), United States v. Ishmael, 48 F.3d 850. 856 (5th Cir.)
(agreeing with Eighth Circuit that no intimate details of home are revealed), cert. denied. 116 S.
Ct. 74 (1995); United States v. Myers, 46 F.3d 668, 669 (7th Cir.) (acknowledging that scan
revealed inordinate amounts of heat), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 213 (1995). Compare United States
v. Ford, 34 F.3d 992, 996 (11th Cir. 1994) (stating that low resolution of FLIR rendered it
incapable of revealing intimate details); United States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056. 1059 (8th Cir.)
(noting that FLIR revealed no intimate details of home), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 664 (1994):
United States v. Olson, 21 F.3d 847, 848 n.5 (8th Cir.) (stating that FLIR revealed rafters and
trailer divided into two rooms), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 230 (1994) and United States v. Penny-
Feeney, 773 F. Supp. 220, 228 (D. Haw. 1991) (finding use of FLIR to detect heat on exterior
of house was nonintrusive), aff'd on other grounds sub nom.. United States v. Feeney. 984 F.2d
1053 (9th Cir. 1993) (declining to address use of FLIR because independent grounds for probable
cause established) with United States v. Cusumano, 67 F.3d 1497. 1504 (10th Cir. 1995) (noting
that thermal imager might be able to detect two people in bedroom engaged in sexual activity);
Field, 855 F. Supp. at 1531 n.7 (finding that properly trained FLIR operator could detect whether
guest room radiated heat, presence of visitors, television in use, or presence of hot water from
bathroom) and State v. Young, 867 P.2d 593, 595 (Wash. 1994) (finding infrared device capable
of detecting human form near open window or leaning against thin barrier).
31 See United States v. Kyllo, 37 F.3d 526, 530-31 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding that quality of
image and degree of detail obtained by specific thermal imaging device is determinative of
whether scan is "search" within Fourth Amendment).
32 See Field, 855 F. Supp at 1531. Chief Judge Crabb, however, appeared less concerned
than the magistrate judge about the capabilities of a FLIR in police surveillance. She objected to
the intrusiveness of the device irrespective of the degree of detail obtained. Id. at 1519.
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Amendment privacy. It suggests protective measures available to a court
for limiting the possibility of FLIR abuse.
I. HOW CouRTS APPLY KATz
In determining which expectations of privacy are reasonable, courts
seem to focus their inquiry on two broad criteria: (1) the location of a
surveillance; and (2) its degree of intrusiveness.33
A. The Significance of Place
Although Katz placed little emphasis on the location of a surveil-
lance,3 4 subsequent case law has found this factor to be important in
determining whether a "search" has occurred.35 For example, in Oliver
v. United States,36 after receiving reports that the defendant was growing
marijuana on his farm, two narcotics agents went to the property to
investigate.37 Ignoring a "No Trespassing" sign, the officers walked
around a locked gate onto a footpath and found marijuana in an open field
one mile from the defendant's home.38 The Court held that the police
intrusion was permissible under the Fourth Amendment since activities
conducted in an open field do not give rise to a privacy expectation that
" See Wilkins, supra note 3, at 1080 (advocating tripartite analysis of location, degree of
intrusiveness, and surveillance goal). Courts have developed factors with which to analyze the
Fourth Amendment concern in this area because, without such an approach, the Katz test is
difficult to apply. See supra note 11.
-1 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. "For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What
a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of
Fourth Amendment protection." Id.; Wilkins, supra note 3. at 1109 (stating that dictum in Katz
appears to reject significance of "place" in Fourth Amendment analysis): Elizabeth Schutz, Note,
The Fourth Amendment Rights of the Homeless, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 1003, 1011 (1992)
(reporting common belief that Katz eradicated significance of "place").
-15 See, e.g., California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 212-13 (1986) (recognizing heightened
privacy expectations in curtilage); Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227. 235 (1986)
("The curtilage area immediately surrounding a private house has long been given protection as
a place where the occupants have a reasonable and legitimate expectation of privacy that society
is prepared to accept."); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984) (stating that certain
areas deserve heightened protection from government invasion); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S.
573, 589 (1980) (stating that "[t]he Fourth Amendment protects the individual's privacy in a
variety of settings" but privacy is most clearly defined in home). Compare United States v.
Knotts, 460 U.S. 276. 285 (1983) (holding that use of tracking beeper where car's movement was
readily observable by naked eye did not violate any legitimate expectation of privacy) with United
States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714-21 (1984) (refusing to suppress evidence, but holding that
monitoring of beeper in private residence violates Fourth Amendment).
466 U.S. 170 (1984).
31 Id. at 173.
s Id.
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society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.39
B. The Intrusion Factor
In determining whether a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred,
courts also consider the degree of intrusiveness which results from a
surveillance.o A variety of factors assist courts in deciding whether an
impermissible intrusion has actually occurred. These factors include local
custom,4' violation of law,42 the use of technologically advanced equip-
ment,43 and most importantly, the intimacy of the information revealed
from surveillance. 44 In United States v. Place,45 Drug Enforcement
11 Id. at 178-79. Surprisingly, however, the Court gave little consideration to the fact that the
officers trespassed upon the defendant's property, ignoring a locked gate and a "No Trespass"
sign. Id. at 175. Additionally, the Court stated that the correct test was not whether private
activity was concealed, but rather whether "the government's intrusion infringes upon the
personal and societal values protected by the Fourth Amendment." Oliver, 466 U.S. at 182-83.
1 See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986) (noting that observational method was
not physically intrusive); Wilkins, supra note 3, at 1103-04.
" See Schutz, supra note 34, at 1020 (suggesting that "Court places great emphasis on
societal customs-rather than mere legality-in determining whether an expectation of privacy is
one society would regard as reasonable"): see also Florida v. Riley. 488 U.S. 445, 450-51 (1989)
(discussing frequency of public air travel as important factor in determining that no reasonable
expectation of privacy existed for observations obtained from navigable air space), California v.
Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988) (holding that no reasonable expectation existed in discarded
garbage since it is common knowledge that garbage is readily accessible to public).
42 See Riley, 488 U.S. at 445. In Riley., an officer flew over the defendant's house after
receiving a tip that he was growing marijuana. Id. at 448. The Court found it significant that the
helicopter flew at a height of 400 feet - well within public navigable airspace. Id. at 451 (stating
that "it is of. . . importance that the helicopter in this case was not violating the law-) (emphasis
in original); see also Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 144 n. 12 (1978) (stating that Court has not
abandoned property concepts in determining Fourth Amendment violation): United States v.
Taborda, 635 F.2d 131, 138 n.9 (2d Cir. 1980) (stating that "[wihether unenhanced viewing
would implicate the Fourth Amendment would depend on whether the viewer properly occupies
his vantage point" and that "[a] trespass ordinarily would make the viewing unlawful"): Stein-
berg, supra note 7, at 585-86 (stating that courts remain likely to invalidate warrantless searches
that involve physical trespass into constitutionally protected areas). But see Oliver. 466 U.S. at
176-77 (distinguishing open fields from houses protected by Fourth Amendment).
" See Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238 (1986) (explaining, in dictum,
warrantless use of highly sophisticated technology may be constitutionally proscribed), United
States v. Agapito, 620 F.2d 324, 330 (2d Cir.) (distinguishing natural hearing from electronically
enhanced hearing), cert. denied. 449 U.S. 834 (1980); Taborda, 635 F.2d at 139 (holding that
observation of defendant's apartment through use of high powered telescope 190 feet away
required search warrant).
4 See United States v. Ford, 34 F.3d 992, 996 (11th Cir. 1994) (describing intimacy of detail
and activity revealed by surveillance as significant factor); see also Dow Chem. Co., 476 U.S.
at 238 (noting that photographs were "not so revealing of intimate details as to raise constitutional
concerns"); Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 215 n.3 (acknowledging that technology revealing intimate
associations, objects, or activities may be unduly invasive); Taborda, 635 F.2d at 139 (noting that
telescopes may reveal "intimate details of a person's private life, which he legitimately expects
[Vol. 69:633
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Agents subjected the defendant's bags to a canine sniff.' The Supreme
Court found that the agents had reasonable suspicion to believe the
defendant was involved in drug trafficking. 7 In holding that the sniff was
not a "search," the Court reasoned that the investigative technique was
"much less intrusive than a typical search" because the quantum of
obtainable information was limited.'
C. Application to Field
A home is worthy of stringent privacy protections.49 To be constitu-
tional, therefore, a FLIR scan must be minimally intrusive when the
previously mentioned two-prong test is applied. The cases seem to indicate
that the two factors of intrusiveness which may make a FLIR scan unduly
invasive are: (1) the intimacy of detail relayed; and (2) the sophistication
of the technology used. A FLIR is a highly advanced machine whose scan
can detect heat from virtually any object.5 0 Some have suggested that
society fears this type of technology more than any other type." Since
the Fourth Amendment protects a person's privacy, however, a technologi-
cally enhanced surveillance is only unconstitutional if it reveals intimate
information. 2 Under the facts of existing thermal imagery case law,53
will not be observed"); Wilkins, supra note 3, at 1104-07 (discussing importance of intimacy in
determining whether constitutional search occurred).
462 U.S. 696 (1983).
46 Id. at 699.
47 Id. at 698-99.
4 Id. at 707.
4 E.g., Wilkins, supra note 3, at 1112 ("[H]ome is sacred in Fourth Amendment terms.
." (citing Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 810 (1984))).
s See United States v. Field, 855 F. Supp. 1518, 1522 (W.D. Wis. 1994) (reporting expert's
testimony that "all objects radiate some thermal energy") (emphasis in original).
11 See Lisa S. Morris, Note, Photo Radar: Friend or Foe, 61 UMKC L. REv. 805, 808
(1993) (stating that many consider use of photoradar "sneaky" and Orwellian); see also Field,
855 F. Supp. at 1533 (suggesting that public would have expectation of privacy if it was aware
of potential use of FLIR technology).
52 See United States v. Ishmael, 48 F.3d 850, 855 (5th Cir.) ("The crucial inquiry, as in any
search and seizure analysis, is whether the technology reveals 'intimate details.'"). cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 74 (1995); see also United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 122-23 (1984). In
Jacobsen, members of an Airport Federal Express office opened a damaged package pursuant to
company policy regarding insurance claims. Id. at 111. After employees discovered four plastic
bags containing white powder, they called the Drug Enforcement Agency ("DEA"). Id. A DEA
agent then removed specimens from the bags and tested them, finding the substance to be cocaine.
Id. at 111-12. The Court held the field test was not a "search" or "seizure" because the test could
only reveal whether the previously suspicious powder was cocaine. Id. at 122. Although the
defendant had some expectation of privacy, it was not one which society would regard as
reasonable. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 122-23 ("A chemical test that merely discloses whether or not
a particular substance is cocaine does not compromise any legitimate interest in privacy."); see
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constitutional concerns do not seem to arise when using the intrusion
factors mentioned above. 4  Even if one was to dismiss the factor
approach advocated by scholars,55 it seems that the Supreme Court has
already upheld warrantless acts that were far more invasive than FLIR searches.
56
also supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text. The use of police radar guns is analogous to a
FLIR scan. Police use radar guns to detect speeding motorists. The gun's scan is virtually
impossible to prevent once an automobile passes through the detectable zone. Fourth Amendment
issues do not arise, however, since the scan does not invade the motorist's privacy. Cf. United
States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983) (asserting reduced expectation of privacy in car on
public highway); Morris, supra note 51, at 817 (arguing that photograph taken by photo radar
device would probably not be invasion of privacy because automobile is exposed to public view
and motorists do not possess expectation of privacy when committing crime in public). It seems
that the privacy interest is something more than an intent to hide criminal activity. See Jacobsen,
466 U.S. at 137 (Brennan. J., dissenting) (stating that Court's reasoning implies that possession
of contraband reduces individuals' reasonable expectation of privacy).
" United States v. Cusumano, 67 F.3d 1497, 1499 (10th Cir. 1995) (finding that imager
revealed "hot spots" along walls, roof, and areas near front door); Ishmael, 48 F.3d at 852 (ob-
serving that water exiting building was hotter than when it entered and ground next to building
was warmer than ground further away); United States v. Robinson. 62 F.3d 1325, 1327 (1 lth
Cir. 1995) (finding that home was considerably warmer than surrounding houses). see, e.g.,
United States v. Robertson, 39 F.3d 891, 894 (8th Cir. 1994) (stating that observations of
readings showed high amount of heat emanating from two or three areas of trailer), cert. denied.
115 S. Ct. 1812 (1995); United States v. Ford, 34 F.3d 992, 993 (1 lth Cir. 1994) (observing that
mobile home emitted inordinate amount of heat through its floors and walls): United States v.
Pinson. 24 F.3d 1056. 1057 (8th Cir.) (establishing through affidavit that excessive heat emitted
from window, roof and skylight), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 664 (1994); United States v. Olson.
21 F.3d 847. 848 n.5 (8th Cir.) (due to extreme heat, photographs revealed rafters and that trailer
was divided into two rooms), cert. denied. 115 S. Ct. 230 (1994).
' Although most of the FLIR searches previously discussed occurred in a home. it appears
that in performing the search no laws were violated and no intimate details were observed. Thus.
it is asserted that since the scans were minimally intrusive, they did not constitute a -search"
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, even if they were within the confines of a highly
protected home. But see infra note 61.
" Many scholars have advocated a Fourth Amendment analysis which implements the use
of balancing factors. See, e.g., Wilkins, supra note 3. at 1080 (stating that Court implicitly
focused on three interrelated inquires in determining whether government has violated reasonable
expectation of privacy): Clifford S. Fishman, Technologically Enhanced Visual Surveillance and
the Fourth Amendment: Sophistication, Availability and the Expectation of Privac . 26 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 315. 317-18 (1988) (recognizing pattern of Court in considering three factors to
determine if search has occurred); see also Steinberg, supra note 7, at 612 (observing that
Supreme Court primarily considers four factors in Fourth Amendment analysis).
56 See, e.g.. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 445-46 (1989) (finding that government
helicopter that flew over defendant's fence-enclosed property to peer into greenhouse with missing
roof panels did not violate Fourth Amendment); Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227,
228-29 (1986) (determining that aerial photographs taken by Environmental Protection Agency
of heavily secured chemical plant with high precision mapping camera was not "search");
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986) (reiterating that it was not Fourth Amendment
violation for police to fly over and take pictures of backyard enclosed by six-foot outer fence and
ten-foot inner fence without warrant); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 184 (1984)
(concluding that officers walking around locked gate containing "No Trespass" sign to trespass
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Chief Judge Crabb may have put too much emphasis on the home as
the place of the scanY In one Supreme Court case, then Chief Judge
Burger stated that "the home is sacred in Fourth Amendment terms ...
because of ... the occupants' privacy interests in the activities that take
place within."58 Admittedly, an expectation of privacy is reasonable in
a home because it is an area of intimate and personal activities. 9 In
Field, however, the FLIR survey only revealed "a white area on Field's
house. "I Even the thermal imaging expert was unable to identify the hot
spot's origin." It is submitted that this was not the type of privacy
interest which the Fourth Amendment was designed to protect.62
II. BALANCING LAW ENFORCEMENT AND PRIVACY INTERESTS
It is probable that Chief Judge Crabb was concerned about possible
on defendant's open field did not constitute "warrantless" search), United States v. Knotts, 460
U.S. 276, 277, 285 (1983) (holding that law enforcement agents' insertion of electronic beeper
into defendant's chemical drum in order to trace him to secluded cabin was not "seaich"); Smith
v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745-46 (1979) (holding that police officers' installation and use of
pen register to record phone numbers of defendant's calls was not "search").
Courts confronted with the thermal imagery issue tend to focus on privacy intrusions by
comparing a FLIR to other types of surveillance equipment. See United States v. Penny-Feeney,
773 F. Supp. 220, 226 (D. Haw. 1991) (stating that FLIR scan is analogous to dog's sniff), aff'd
on other grounds sub nom., United States v. Feeney, 984 F.2d 1053 (9th Cir. 1993); United
States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056, 1058 (8th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 664 (1994).
Analogies to other types of technology are imperfect since a FLIR does not enhance senses but
relays information that is qualitatively different. As a result, critics try to distinguish analogies.
See, e.g., United States v. Field, 855 F. Supp. 1518, 1519. 1532-33 (W.D. Wis. 1994) (refuting
comparison that escaped heat is similar to garbage and that FLIR scan is analogous to dog's
sniff); Steele, supra note 12, at 30-39 (stating that canine is trained to detect only illicit narcotics
while FLIR detects all heat); Pochurek, supra note 11, at 155-59 (refuting analogies).
11 See Field, 855 F. Supp. at 1519 ("Thermal imaging can extract information from within
a person's home, the place most deserving of protection from government intrusion.").
. Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 810 (1984) (emphasis in original).
. Wilkins, supra note 3, at 1112. Katz shifted the emphasis on the home from a literal
Fourth Amendment analysis to an area associated with privacy. Id. at 1110-11.
Field, 855 F. Supp. at 1523.
6, Id. The government argued that a thermal imager cannot detect activities within a home.
Id. at 1531. In rejecting this argument, the court stated, "if the thermal imager doesn't tell the
government anything useful, then it has no value in determining whether there is probable cause
to issue a search warrant." Id. Instead of finding that the search warrant lacked probable cause.
the court held that a FLIR scan constitutes a "search" since it reveals detailed information and
"does not fit into any exception to the warrant requirement." Id. at 1533.
-' But see United States v. Cusumano, 67 F.3d 1497, 1510 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding that
because thermal imager revealed hot spots on garage wall, roof, and areas near front door, scan
impermissibly intruded into defendant's Fourth Amendment privacy), State v. Young, 867 P.2d
593, 594 (Wash. 1994) (finding that because FLIR displayed abnormal heating patterns
unobtainable through unaided observation, its use was unconstitutional).
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governmental abuses.63 It is submitted, however, that the court should
have attempted to strike a balance between the Fourth Amendment and law
enforcement interests.64  This can be accomplished by requiring that
reasonable suspicion exist before permitting FLIR scans, and by requiring
that the scan be videotaped.
In People v. Dunn,65 New York police brought a narcotics detection
dog to the common hallway outside the defendant's door after receiving
information that his apartment contained drugs.' When the dog indicated
the presence of drugs, a search warrant was obtained and executed.67 The
defendant moved to have the seized evidence suppressed based on his
assertion that the warrant was improperly issued. 68  He claimed the
warrant was based in part on a "canine sniff" which he contended
constituted a warrantless search.69 The New York Court of Appeals held
I The magistrate judge stated expressed concern about the public becoming aware of the
FLIR's capabilities. Field, 855 F. Supp. at 1533. Society would develop a subjective expectation
of privacy in certain heat sources and would accept this expectation as being reasonable. Id. But
"[w]hen determining whether surveillance is unduly invasive, a court must focus on what actually
occurred, not on what might occur in some future case." United States v. Domitrovich. 852 F.
Supp. 1460, 1474 (E.D. Wash. 1994), aff'd, 57 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 1995); see Dow Chem. Co.
v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238 n.5 (1986) ("Fourth Amendment cases must be decided on
the facts of each case, not by extravagant generalizations. '[W]e have never held that potential,
as opposed to actual, invasions of privacy constitute searches for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment.'" (quoting United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705. 712 (1984))). Other courts have
also been concerned about the possibility that the government may impermissibly use a FLIR.
Cusumano, 67 F.3d at 1504 (stating that thermal imager is currently capable of revealing private
activities, and that allowing it to use device would eviscerate Constitution). Even if the
government exercises discretion by avoiding the viewing of personal activities, little would
prevent it from using the FLIR in neighborhood surveillances to detect unusual heat patterns. See
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 137-38 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Brennan
stated:
[T]he Court adopts a general rule that a surveillance technique does not constitute a
search if it reveals only whether or not an individual possesses contraband.. . . In fact.
the Court's analysis is so unbounded that if a device were developed that could detect,
from outside of a building, the presence of cocaine inside, there would be no
constitutional obstacle to the police cruising through a residential neighborhood and
using the device to identify all homes in which the drug is present.
Id. This problem can be solved by requiring a reasonable suspicion standard for FLIR use. See
infra notes 64-75 and accompanying text.
I See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925) (stating that Fourth Amendment
should be construed to conserve public and private interests).
77 N.Y.2d 19 (1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1219 (1991).
66Id. at 21.
67 Id. (stating that, based on dogs' reaction and prior information, search warrant was
obtained).
Is Id. at 22.
69 Id. (arguing that "canine sniff" conducted outside apartment was unsupported by probable
cause and constituted "unlawful warrantless search").
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that the sniff was a "search" under the New York State Constitution.7'
Noting that a canine's smell is less intrusive than a full-blown search, the
court stated that, "[g]iven the uniquely discriminate and nonintrusive nature
of such an investigative device, as well as its significant utility to law
enforcement authorities, we conclude that it may be used without a warrant
or probable cause, provided that the police have a reasonable suspicion that
a residence contains illicit contraband." 7' It is submitted that this
reasoning is applicable to FLIR uses.' For a scan to remain constitution-
al it may not reveal the details of a home.73 Therefore, a scan cannot be
the sole information used to establish the probability of marijuana
growth.74 Since an infrared scan can only be one factor in a probable
cause determination, authorities must acquire more information to obtain
a search warrant. If FLIR use was held to a reasonable suspicion standard,
police officers would be forced to obtain this additional information prior
to using a FLIR scan.75 If the government could not establish reasonable
suspicion, it would not be permitted to use the FLIR. If a reasonable
suspicion did exist, a FLIR could be used to help establish the probable
11 Dunn, 77 N.Y.2d at 25.
71 Id. at 26 (citations omitted).
I Reasonable suspicion depends upon the content and reliability of information. Alabama v.
White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990). It is a lower standard than probable cause, requiring less
evidence and less reliability. Id. In determining whether reasonable suspicion exists, however,
the content and reliability of information are evaluated under the totality of circumstances. Id.
Thus, a tip which has a low degree of reliability must be supported by more evidence. Id. For
example, an anonymous tip corroborated by independent police work may provide the reasonable
suspicion necessary to use a FLIR scan. Id. at 332. The additional evidence might include the
defendant's electricity bills. White, 496 U.S. at 332.
73 See supra notes 49-62 and accompanying text.
I "Probable cause for a search is established when there are reasonable grounds to believe
that objects connected to criminal activity. . . are presently located in the particular place to be
searched." United States v. Porco, 842 F. Supp. 1393, 1399 (D. Wyo. 1994), aff'd sub norn.,
United States v. Cusumano, 67 F.3d 1497 (10th Cir. 1995). Probable cause exists when, given
all the circumstances, there is a fair probability that evidence of a crime will be found. Illinois
v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). Because the FLIR is imprecise, it cannot establish a fair
probability of criminality without other supporting evidence.
7-' For example, in Field, the sheriff subpoenaed the defendant's electricity bills after
conducting an infrared survey. United States v. Field, 855 F. Supp. 1518, 1523 (W.D. Wis.
1994). If the informants' information was insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion, the sheriff
could have obtained the bills first to help meet this requirement. See United States v. Domi-
trovich, 852 F. Supp. 1460, 1475 n.3 (E.D. Wash. 1994) (stating that law enforcer may obtain
power consumption records without warrant) (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743
(1978) (holding that there is no expectation of privacy in information disclosed to third persons)),
aff'd, 57 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 1995); Porco, 842 F. Supp. at 1398 (holding that sheriff permis-
sibly obtained defendant's electric bills from power company without warrant because there is no
legitimate expectation of privacy in information revealed to third party).
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cause necessary to obtain a search warrant.
Furthermore, to avoid testimony "patently tailored to meet constitu-
tional objections, "76 law enforcement agents should be required to
videotape a FLIR surveillance." The court could then view the tape to
see if impermissible details were relayed.78
III. CONCLUSION
Supreme Court cases upholding technologically enhanced surveillances
have been heavily and justifiably79 criticized.' ° The capabilities of these
devices may cause citizens to view their freedom differently.8 Reason-
able expectations of privacy diminish when the Court permits governmental
intrusions.' Under the current state of the Fourth Amendment's pro-
76 People v. Smith, 430 N.Y.S.2d 95, 97 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980).
7 See Porco, 842 F. Supp. at 1396 (stating that FLIR scans can be videotaped).
7 Police officers could take steps to prevent a FLIR from impermissibly infringing on the
privacy of a homeowner while maintaining the machine's accuracy. One method of accomplishing
this would be by calibrating the infrared device to pick up heat sources likely to be plant growth
lamps. See Field, 855 F. Supp. at 1522 (stating that thermal imagery expert routinely set FLIR
to only detect very hot objects). Secondly, officers could perform an aerial scan of a home. Since
a roof is usually thicker than a wall, the possibility of seeing cooler objects is lessened. See id.
at 1531 (stating that in Washington v. Young, 867 P.2d 593, 594 (Sup. Ct. Wash. 1994). parties
stipulated that infrared device could detect human forms near windows or behind walls made of
plywood or similar materials).
A more difficult thermal imagery problem would be limiting the ability of an officer to use
a home as a control group. A FLIR operator might seek the permission of various homeowners
in the neighborhood or establish the police department as the norm. Pochurek points out that an
infinite amount of factors such as the home's age and insulation may cause differences in heat
loss. Pochurek. supra note 11, at 158.
" E.g., Pochurek, supra note 11, at 137 (concluding that such surveillances compromise
fourth amendment), Steinberg, supra note 7, at 582 (noting that constitutional problems are
caused by permitting sense enhanced surveillance); Gutterman, supra note 2. at 650 (stating that
Court's Fourth Amendment approach fails to protect privacy rights).
I Traditionally, a person learned of a police investigation when authorities presented the
search warrant. Steinberg, supra note 7. at 569. However, the secrecy of a technologically en-
hanced investigation provides no such notice. Id. Public knowledge of government action helps
prevent arbitrary police behavior because the police will be made accountable for mistakes and
unjustified searches. Id. at 572-73. The secrecy of technologically advanced surveillance,
however, can encourage arbitrary government acts. Id. at 573-74.
"' Because citizens may be unaware of investigations, they may begin to live in fear.
Steinberg, supra note 7, at 570. This may cause a 'chilling effect' on the exercise of First
Amendment rights. Id. at 571 (quoting Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 11 (1972)).
1 See Wingo, supra note 8, at 21. Once it becomes common knowledge that police utilize
a surveillance device, the court can conclude that "society" must realize it is no longer reasonable
to expect privacy in something which the government can routinely detect. Id. "If reasonable
expectations of privacy disappear whenever there is a possibility that unseen eyes may be
observing one's activities, then such expectations may no longer exist at all." Id. But see Smith
v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740-41 n.5 (1978) (noting that "where an individual's subjective
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tections, however, the details revealed by thermal imagers such as that used
in Field do not invade a reasonable expectation of privacy. The Field
court's attempt to limit technological surveillance by finding thermal
imaging unconstitutional is admirable but unwarranted. The court should
have directed its concern toward containing the possibilities of future
abuses. This can be accomplished by: (1) requiring the government to
acquire a reasonable suspicion of indoor marijuana growth before using a
FLIR; and (2) requiring the government to videotape its surveillance.
These restrictions strike a fair balance between law enforcement and
privacy interests.
Ralph Janzen
expectations had been 'conditioned' by influences alien to well-recognized Fourth Amendment
freedoms . .. [i]n determining whether a 'legitimate expectation of privacy' existed . . . a
normative inquiry would be proper").
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